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Rethinking the Classification of Credit Acquisitions Under
Louisiana's Community Property Law
Dian Tooley Arruebarrena*
Although it has been ten years since the revision of Louisiana's
matrimonial regimes law, it is not surprising that no court has determined
how credit acquisitions should be classified under the new law.' What
may be surprising is that the pre-revision law on credit sales is less
certain today than it was ten years ago. The reason for this uncertainty
is the 1981 Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Curtis v. Curtis,2 which
repudiated 120 years of credit sale jurisprudence and substituted an
undesirable new test. Some of the jurisprudence rejected by Curtis needed
to be re-evaluated, and perhaps discarded, but some of it was reasonable
and should have been retained. Inasmuch as the revision has not changed
the principles governing the classification of property as community or
separate, the wholesale rejection in Curtis of Louisiana's jurisprudence
dealing with credit transactions has rendered classification under the new
law uncertain.
In part I of this article, the development of classification principles
for credit sales up until the Curtis decision, including applicable pre-
revision Civil Code provisions and supreme court decisions, will be
analyzed. Part II entails a discussion of the Curtis decision. In part III,
the current classification articles will be outlined, with an evaluation of
several classification tests for their compatibility with these articles. Part
IV examines those policies that classification laws should promote and
assesses the extent to which selected classification tests advance those
policies. Part V concludes that the test for classifying credit sales created
by Curtis is undesirable, and that the portion of the repudiated juris-
prudence that had established a valid classification scheme is preferable
and should be reinstated.
© Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University. The writer expresses her appre-
ciation to Professors Cynthia Samuel and A.N. Yiannopoulos for their critical reading
of the manuscript and valuable suggestions.
1. Louisiana's first important credit sale case was not decided until 36 years after
the 1825 Code was effective. See infra text accompanying note 18.
2. 403 So. 2d 56 (La. 1981).
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I. HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATION OF CREDIT ACQUISITIONS
A. The Reinvestment Doctrine
The matrimonial regimes title of the Civil Code does not expressly
provide for the classification of property acquired in credit transactions.
In fact, until 1912 the Code did not contain a single provision classifying
property acquired with separate things as separate.' Despite the absence
of such a provision, the Louisiana judiciary, through the reinvestment
doctrine, early recognized the ability of a spouse to acquire separate
property during the marriage with separate funds. Under the reinvestment
doctrine as recognized by Louisiana courts and the Spanish law upon
which the doctrine is based, 4 a spouse owning separate property could
sell that property and "reinvest" the proceeds into other property. The
property acquired through the reinvestment would be that spouse's sep-
arate property.
The reinvestment doctrine, sometimes called the principle of real
subrogation, provided a limited exception to the rule that acquisitions
during the marriage were community property. This general principle
was set forth in the Civil Code, which classified as community:
the estates which [the husband and wife] may acquire during
the marriage ... by purchase, or in any other similar way, even
although the purchase be only in the name of one of the two
and not of both, because in that case the period of time when
the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not the person
who made the purchase.5
For the reinvestment doctrine to operate, there were two conditions:
First, the reinvestment had to be bona fide, meaning that the acquisition
really was a reinvestment of separate funds. 6 Second, the spouse making
the investment must have intended that the property acquired would
become his or her separate property. 7 Both spouses were required to
demonstrate the intention to reinvest separate funds by taking title to
3. 1912 La. Acts No. 170, § 1, amending La. Civ. Code art. 2334 (1870). Even
prior to the 1912 amendment, there was one limited exception, a provision dealing with
immovables acquired with the wife's dotal funds. See La. Civ. Code art. 2356 (1870).
4. Savenat v. LeBreton, 1 La. 520 (1830).
5. La. Civ. Code art. 2402 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1. The
1825 Code and the 1808 Digest contained identical provisions. La. Civ. Code art. 2371
(1825); La. Digest of 1808 p. 336, art. 64.
6. Gonor v. Gonor, 11 Rob. 526, 528 (La. 1845); Rousse v. Wheeler, 4 Rob. 114,
118 (La. 1843); Terrell v. Cutrer, 1 Rob. 367, 369 (La. 1842) ("It is certainly of their
essence ... that it should be a bona fide re-investment of money under her control ... ").
7. Thus, reinvestment may differ from the 1912 provision by which things acquired
with separate funds appear to be automatically classified as separate.
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the property in the name of the reinvesting spouse If title were placed
in both spouses' names, 9 or if title to property acquired with the wife's
funds were placed in the husband's name,10 reinvestment was precluded,
and the property would be classified as community.
Whether the intention to reinvest had to be declared in the act of
acquisition depended upon whether the acquiring spouse was a wife or
a husband. Because the husband was head and master of the community,
he had to declare in the act of acquisition that he intended the property
to be separate and that he would pay for the property with his separate
funds. This special rule, known as the double declaration requirement,
evolved because of concern stemming from the husband's broad man-
agement power. 1 Absent a double declaration, the property was classified
as community, regardless of the source of funds from which the property
was paid.
The courts were more lenient toward wives and never required that
the intention to reinvest be stated in the act of acquisition.12 If the act
were silent about her intention, she was always free to adduce proof
at a later date. 3 The courts did require, however, that a wife administer
8. Succession of Vanrensellaer, 6 La. Ann. 803 (1851); Squier v. Stockton, 5 La.
Ann. 741 (1850); Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La. 295 (1841), rev'd on other grounds by Dillion
v. Dillion, 35 La. Ann. 94 (1883).
9. Tally v. Heffner, 29 La. Ann. 583 (1877); Succession of Miangolarra, 297 So.
2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
10. Le Blanc v. Le Blanc, 20 La. Ann. 206 (1868); Wood v. Harrell, 14 La. Ann.
61 (1859); Dees v. Seale, 5 La. Ann. 688 (1850); Stokes v. Shackleford, 12 La. 170
(1838); Brown and Wife v. Cobb, 10 La. 172 (1836); Borie v. Borie, 5 La. 87 (1833).
Similarly, if the husband invested the wife's separate funds without her knowledge, the
acquisition would be without the wife's intention to reinvest, and the thing would be
community. Comeau v. Fontenot, 19 La. 406 (1841); Ducrest's Heirs v. Bijeau's Estate,
8 Mart. (n.s.) 192 (La. 1829).
11. The first case to advert to the necessity for a special rule for husbands was
Young v. Young, 5 La. Ann. 611 (1850), which stressed the need for the husband's
intention to be "distinct and clear." The second case was Bass v. Larche, 7 La. Ann.
104 (1852), in which it was stated:
[Als he was the head of the community, the fact that he purchased in his own
name, proves nothing in his favor. The evidence of his intention to purchase
for his separate account, should be sufficient to throw the loss upon him in
case the property purchased had diminished in value, or totally perished.
Id. at 104. By 1859, the rule was intact. See Joffrion v. Bordelon, 14 La. Ann. 618
(1859).
12. See, e.g., Succession of Burke, 107 La. 82, 31 So. 391 (1902); Pinard v. Holten,
30 La. Ann. 167 (1878).
13. The intent requirement never was a real barrier for a wife seeking to have property
classified as separate. In one case the husband was holding the wife's money until she
directed him to invest it, and the court said that her instruction to him was a resumption
of administration by her. See Terrell v. Cutrer, I Rob. 367 (La. 1842).
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the separate property that she was reinvesting.1 4 Such a requirement was
considered unnecessary for a husband because he managed both the
community and his separate property. One court has suggested that the
reason this requirement was imposed upon wives was to ensure that the
revenues of their separate property would be separate, thereby guar-
anteeing a source of funds for the credit portion of the price. 5 This
explanation, while plausible when applied to credit sales, ignores the
fact that the requirement was first imposed in Dominguez v. Lee, 16 a
case involving a cash sale. The explanation given by the Dominguez
court for the requirement was that a wife's power to sell her separate
property and invest the proceeds is corollary to her power to administer
her separate property. Thus, she must administer her separate property
in order to possess the right to reinvest separate funds.'
7
B. The Pre-Curtis Credit Sale Jurisprudence
The first credit sale case in Louisiana was Bouligny v. Fortier,"8
decided in 1861. The property in dispute was a plantation that the wife
had acquired in her own name for $80,000. About $5,000 was paid at
the time of the sale, and for the balance she assumed the payment of
certain claims and executed her promissory notes. She asserted that the
property was community because she did not have any separate funds
for investment, and because she had acted through marital influence.' 9
14. Unless the wife administered her paraphernal property "separately and alone,"
her husband was considered to be managing it. La. Civ. Code art. 2385 (1870). However,
if a husband was administering his wife's separate property, the courts usually permitted
her to prove that he was acting as her mandatary. See, e.g., Miller v. Handy, 33 La.
Ann. 160 (1881).
15. See Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
16. 17 La. 295 (1841), see supra note 8. The requirement has frequently been imposed
in cash acquisition classification disputes; see, e.g., Stauffer, Macready & Co. v. Morgan,
39 La. Ann. 632, 2 So. 98 (1887), including two relatively recent cash transaction cases
where the only issue discussed was the necessity that the wife administer the separate
property being reinvested. See Southwest Natural Production Co. v. Anderson, 239 La.
496, 118 So. 2d 897 (1960); Howell v. Harris, 18 So. 2d 668 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
17. 17 La. at 299-300. The Louisiana Supreme Court made the following observation
in 1861:
[Ilt is now the well settled jurisprudence of this State, that the right of the
wife to administer personally her paraphernal property and to alienate the same,
•.. implies the faculty of investing or re-investing her paraphernal effects.
Bouligny v. Fortier, 16 La. Ann. 209, 213 (1861).
18. 16 La. Ann. 209 (1861).
19. The facts of Bouligny were quite complicated. The plaintiff was the holder of
the last promissory note due who had the property seized and sold, and who bought it
at the sheriff's sale. He sought to deduct from the price he owed the amount needed to
discharge a mortgage granted by the wife five years after she bought the property. This
was resisted by the wife, who asserted that she had rights to the property superior to
[Vol. 50
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Noting that the reinvestment doctrine creates a limited exception to
the general rule that acquisitions during the marriage are community
property, the court identified two requirements for application of the
doctrine to a credit acquisition by the wife:
[T]he wife is required, not only to prove that she had paraphernal
effects at her disposal, but also that they were ample to enable
her, reasonably, at least to make the new acquisition; otherwise
the contract will be treated as a contract of the community....
The authority to invest, does not carry with it the unbounded
liberty to run into wild and ruinous speculations .... We there-
fore conclude that it is against the policy of the law, and the
spirit and letter of our system of legal community, to sanction
contracts made by the wife, under pretext of investing her par-
aphernal effects, when, as in the case at bar, the amount invested
bears no proportion to the value of the property substituted in
its place .... 20
The first requirement mentioned by the court is the existence of
"ample paraphernal effects" to permit her reasonably to make the
acquisition. The second requirement mentioned is a certain relationship
between the amount invested and the value of the property acquired.
The court held that the property was community because the amount
invested was disproportionate to the value of the property acquired.
"The amount invested" is apparently a reference to the cash portion
of the price, or downpayment. The court did not explain the type of
relationship that must exist between the downpayment and the value of
the property acquired in order for the acquisition to be classified as
separate. 2
the mortgagee.
She claimed that her husband had received paraphernal funds during the marriage for
which he had not accounted, which created a legal mortgage on her behalf satisfiable
out of all community property, including the property at issue in the litigation. Her claim
would be superior to that of the mortgagee because at that time the wife's legal mortgage
attached when the property was acquired. See H. Daggett, The Community Property
System of Louisiana 44-45 (1945).
An additional complicating factor is that the plaintiff was the wife's brother-in-law and
had participated in the negotiations leading up to the sale. Furthermore, plaintiff was a
member of a firm, apparently a partnership, which was the mortgagee at issue. Finally,
the wife (and apparently the husband) had an account with plaintiff's firm, into which
proceeds from various sources were deposited. The firm paid debts of various kinds from
this account, including payments on this sale.
20. 16 La. Ann. at 214-15.
21. Nor did the court justify its creation of the large downpayment test. However,
the court did state that its classification of the property as community is consistent with
the result which would have been reached under French law. The court said that according
19901
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The "ample paraphernal effects" requirement was not expressly
applied to the facts in Bouligny, which is understandable because both
tests must be met for the property to be classified as separate. The
failure to meet either test would result in classification of the property
as community.
The two requirements created by Bouligny were advanced for dif-
ferent purposes. The court's threshold concern was to apply the rein-
vestment doctrine to credit sales. Hence, the first purpose was to extend
that doctrine to credit acquisitions. The court's second purpose was to
protect wives from "wild and ruinous speculations." The ample para-
phernal effects test appears to have been created as an application of
the reinvestment doctrine, while the large downpayment rule appears to
have been imposed to protect wives from bad investments. Nonetheless,
each requirement accomplishes its purpose to some extent.
The large downpayment requirement clearly protects wives from bad
investments. A large downpayment reduces the risk that some amount
might be owed after seizure and sale of the property for nonpayment
of the debt. Thus, the large downpayment requirement practically in-
sulates wives against personal liability in the event the deferred portion
of the price is not paid. 22 Yet the large downpayment rule is not unrelated
to the reinvestment doctrine. The larger the downpayment, the more
one is justified in concluding that the acquisition is a reinvestment of
separate funds.
The ample paraphernal effects test is appropriate under the rein-
vestment doctrine, the doctrine that enabled spouses to convert separate
property existing in one form into separate property in a different form.
to the French Civil Code and the French commentators, including Duranton, if the property
acquired is worth more than double the separate funds invested, the property is community.
Id. at 215. The court then said:
One of the reasons assigned by Duranton is, that should it be otherwise, a
husband who had sold one of his estates for 6,000 fr. could acquire an estate
of the value of 40,000 fr. or more, with the funds of the community, by simply
declaring in the act, that the acquisition is made to replace his conveyed property.
He would thus take the profits which the community might have otherwise
derived from the acquisition; and this would be contrary to the principle of
the Code, for he owes to the community all his industry, all the profits which
he can derive from his speculations.
Id.
22. The large downpayment requirement thus serves a different function than the
ample paraphernal effects requirement. Despite the expectancy of ample paraphernal funds
with which to make the deferred payments, as from the revenues of a cotton farm, if
the farm were to burn down, or if the price of cotton were to fall, the spouse would
be unable to pay the price when due. Thus, the wife might be exposed to personal liability
upon nonpayment. The large downpayment rule severely lessens that possibility by requiring
that the downpayment be large enough to make the property sufficient security for the
credit portion of the price.
[Vol. 50
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A logical extension of this doctrine to credit acquisitions would be to
require that the spouse possess enough separate funds for both the cash
and deferred portions of the price. Otherwise, the transaction could not
be characterized as a bona fide reinvestment of separate funds. This is
exactly what the ample paraphernal effects test accomplishes. The ample
paraphernal effects requirement protects wives from bad investments in
a limited way. The rule requires that she be able to pay for the in-
vestment, thereby reducing the risk that she might become insolvent on
account of the purchase.
The next credit sale case in Louisiana was Miller v. Handy,2a decided
in 1881. The husband's creditors seized certain property as community
property, and the wife intervened in the proceeding to assert its separate
nature. She had acquired the property in her own name for $25,500,
paying $8,500 cash and assuming the deferred payments. Although the
court approvingly cited Bouligny, it did not expressly apply the large
downpayment rule. Invoking the ample 4paraphernal effects test an-
nounced by Bouligny, the Miller court looked at the classification of
the funds used for the downpayment and evaluated the probability that
the wife could also satisfy the deferred payments out of her separate
funds. Because the wife owned and administered other separate property
whose revenues were adequate to meet the deferred payments, and
because she was actually paying the installments with her separate funds,
the court held that the property was her separate property.
The Miller opinion then acknowledged the following limitation upon
a wife's freedom to purchase on credit: "The cash so invested should
bear such fair proportion to the total price of the purchase, as to render
it reasonably certain the property purchased would furnish sufficient
security for the credit portion of the price. ' 24 This limitation, a re-
statement of the Bouligny large downpayment rule, was not expressly
applied in Miller, although the court, by finding the property to be
separate, impliedly must have found the requirement to have been met.
Thus, the downpayment must have been considered large enough so that
the property itself furnished security for the credit portion of the price. 2'
Subsequent cases did not create new classification tests for credit
acquisitions. Courts classifying property acquired on credit routinely
applied the ample paraphernal effects test, 26 but were inconsistent with
23. 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
24. Id. at 169.
25. In Miller, about one-third of the total sales .price was paid at the time of the
sale. It is unclear why the payment of this amount at the time of sale would be considered
sufficient to render the property adequate security for the unpaid two-thirds of the price.
26. See, e.g., Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1953); Betz v.
Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So. 2d 465 (1947); Rouyer v. Carroll, 47 La. Ann. 768, 17 So.
1990]
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respect to the necessity that the large downpayment test be met for the
property to be classified as separate. Few cases even mentioned the large
downpayment test, 27 and only three cases besides Bouligny and Miller
actually invoked the rule. 28
292 (1895); Forbes v. Layton, 34 La. Ann. 975 (1882); Stevens v. Claiborne Co., 305
So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Succession of Milton, 278 So. 2d 159 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1973); Butler v. Burks, 99 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957); Fortson v.
Moseke, 7 La. App. 131 (2d Cir. 1927).
27. The following cases are the only ones found which mentioned the large down-
payment test. Guilbeau v. Guilbeau, 224 La. 837, 71 So. 2d 129 (1954); Montgomery v.
Bouanchaud, 179 La. 312, 154 So. 8 (1934); Fortier v. Barry, 111 La. 776, 35 So. 900
(1904); Jordy v. Muir, 51 La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898); Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann.
160 (1881); Bouligny v. Fortier, 16 La. Ann. 209 (1861); Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation
& Ref. Inc., 152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Crigler,
12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
Interestingly, there have been three cases involving credit-only transactions. None even
cited the large downpayment rule, although that rule would inevitably require that such
property be classified as community. See Whittington v. Heirs of Pegues, 165 La. 151,
115 So. 441 (1927); Succession of Andrus, 34 La. Ann. 1063 (1882); Lotz v. Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 17 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944).
28. See Fortier v. Barry, III La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904); Jordy v. Muir, 51 La.
Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Crigler, 12 So. 2d 511 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1942). However, classification of the disputed property did not hinge upon
the application of the large downpayment test. In all three of these cases, the wife was
unable to prove that she had paraphernal funds sufficient to permit her to pay the deferred
portion of the price.
In Fortier v. Barry, Ill La. 776, 35 So. 900 (1904), the wife acquired two rental
properties in her own name on the same day from different vendors. The sales price of
the first property was $2,400, $350 of which was paid in cash. The wife executed a note
for the balance of the price, payable one year from the sale. The wife acquired the
second property entirely on credit for a price of $3,000. Although she did execute a
demand note for the price, she agreed in the deed to pay ten percent of the principal
annually.
Her husband's creditor sought to seize both properties and she intervened, asserting
that they were her separate property. The court noted that of the total price of the two
properties, she had paid only 6.50o in cash, pledging her credit for the balances owed.
The only separate property owned by her at the time of the acquisitions was one rental
property. The court looked to the expected revenues from these three properties, and
concluding that the rentals from all properties (less expenses) were insufficient to discharge
the obligations assumed in the sales, held the properties to be community. In Fortier
neither the large downpayment requirement nor the ample paraphernal effects requirement
appears to have been met.
Fortier is subject to criticism for lumping the two purchases together as though they
were a single acquisition. Clearly the wife was in different positions vis a vis the two
properties. She had not repaid a cent on the first property (the Breaux property), and
the entire credit amount was overdue. However, she was apparently current in her re-
payment of the price for the second property (the homestead property). Yet, the court
attached no significance to the fact that she was successfully repaying the price of the
homestead property. But see Succession of Lewis, 45 La. Ann. 833, 12 So. 952 (1893).
This criticism does not mean that the outcome should have been different even if the
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The cases were also inconsistent with regard to the significance of
the source of funds used to pay the credit portion of the price. In most
cases finding the property to be separate, the spouse not only proved
the availability of separate funds with which to pay the price, but actually
used separate funds when the price fell due.29 By contrast, in most cases
holding the property as community, the spouse not only failed to prove
the availability of separate funds with which to pay the price, but also
failed to pay the price with separate funds when the amount fell due.30
Where exceptions were made, the courts usually justified the outcome
based upon the special facts of the case.3
two properties had been considered separately. The homestead property raises a serious
policy question in community property law. The property was purchased entirely on credit,
and at the time of the purchase the wife did not possess adequate separate funds with
which to meet the deferred payments. Thus, under the reinvestment doctrine, this would
not qualify as a bona fide reinvestment. This result should not be affected by the fact
that the property being acquired will produce revenues which will provide a partial source
of repayment. To say that the revenues of the property being acquired will be separate
and therefore that the spouse possesses adequate funds with which to pay the credit
portion is a circular argument. The revenues of the acquired property can be separate
only if the acquired property is separate, and that will occur only if the transaction is
a bona fide reinvestment of the spouse's separate funds. A reinvestment is not bona fide
if a spouse does not possess sufficient separate funds to meet both the cash and credit
portions of the price.
29. See, e.g., Graves v. United States Rubber Co., 237 La. 505, 111 So. 2d 752
(1959); Guilbeau v. Guilbeau, 224 La. 837, 71 So. 2d 129 (1954); Rouyer v. Carroll, 47
La. Ann. 768, 17 So. 292 (1895).
30. See, e.g., Jordy v. Muir, 51 La. Ann. 55, 25 So. 550 (1898); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Crigler, 12 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
31. In Succession of Lewis, 45 La. Ann. 833, 12 So. 952 (1893), there was scant
evidence as to the existence of separate funds with which the wife might have met the
deferred portion of the price. Nonetheless, at the time of the trial she had successfully
paid two-thirds of the price with separate funds. Calling the situation unusual, the court
held the property to be the wife's separate property.
In Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation & Refinery Inc., 152 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1963), the wife proved the availability of separate funds with which to pay the price, but
accidentally used community funds to pay the deferred portion of the price. The court
held that the use of community funds through error had no effect upon the classification
of the property. Id. at 342.
Another exception was a case where a wife bought property totally on credit. Whittington
v. Heirs of Pegues, 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1927). It was not shown that, at the time
of the sale the wife had adequate separate funds with which to meet the deferred payments,
and the property was held community despite the fact that she ultimately made payments
out of her separate funds. The court appeared to base its holding both on the fact that
she did not prove the availability of separate funds at the time of the sale and upon the
fact that the purchase was entirely on credit. Id. at 155, 115 So. at 442 (quoting Succession
of Andrus, 34 La. Ann. 1063 (1882)). The court justified disregarding the use of separate
funds for classification purposes by invoking the principle that the status of property is
fixed at the moment of acquisition.
1990]
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The Code was amended in 1912 to provide that property acquired
with separate funds is separate. Although this enactment did not sanction
any discrimination between husbands and wives who claim property as
separate, the 1912 amendment produced no discernable difference in the
courts' approach. The courts continued to require the wife to prove
that she was administering the separate property she was reinvesting3 2
even though this requirement was rendered unnecessary by the 1912
enactment.3" The large downpayment requirement and the ample para-
phernal effects rule also continued to be cited without any discussion
whether either might have been superseded by the 1912 amendment.3 4
The tests were inconsistent with the 1912 enactment to the extent their
imposition was to protect wives from wild and ruinous speculations,
inasmuch as no discrimination was permitted by that amendment. On
the other hand, the tests were compatible with the amendment to the
extent they were extensions of the reinvestment doctrine to credit ac-
quisitions.
All of the cases discussed and cited in this section involve credit
acquisitions by wives. As previously mentioned, husbands were subjected
to the double declaration requirement. This requirement persisted until
it was legislatively overruled by the 1980 matrimonial regimes revision,
even though the requirement was also probably inconsistent with the
1912 amendment.35 Although there is no case that applied either the
large downpayment test or the ample paraphernal effects rule to a
husband's credit acquisition,3 6 there is no case that expressly refused to
32. See, e.g., Southwest Natural Production Co. v. Anderson, 239 La. 490, 118 So.
2d 897 (1960).
33. Courts required wives to prove administration of the separate property being
invested as a prerequisite to application of the reinvestment doctrine, since the power to
reinvest was viewed as a corollary to the power to administer. See supra text accompanying
notes 14-17. In the absence of an express code provision on the subject, it was not
unreasonable for the courts to view reinvestment as a right flowing from the power of
administration. After the 1912 amendment to the Code, however, the power to reinvest
received express sanction, and there was no longer any need for the courts to impose
this additional requirement.
34. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alice C. Plantation & Refinery Inc., 152 So. 2d 336 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1963).
35. The double declaration requirement was imposed upon husbands to ensure that
their intent to acquire separate property would be known at the time of the acquisition.
See supra text accompanying note 11. The 1912 amendment did not specify that the intent
to acquire separate property was a prerequisite to acquisition of separate property. Even
if the intent requirement survived the 1912 amendment, there was no longer any basis
for discriminating between husbands and wives in their attempts to prove property separate.
Therefore, it is submitted that after 1912 husbands should not have been required to
preserve their intent to acquire separate property in any specific form.
36. However, in Bass v. Larche, 7 La. Ann. 104 (1852), decided when the double
declaration rule was still evolving, the court stated:
[Vol. 50
FAMILY LA W SYMPOSIUM
apply these rules to husbands. Cases involving husbands never reached
the question of the applicable classification rule, most likely because of
the onerous double declaration rule to which husbands alone were sub-
jected.37 One can only speculate whether, in the absence of the double
declaration rule, the courts would have applied either the large down-
payment requirement or the ample paraphernal effects test to credit
acquisitions by husbands.
II. THi CURTIS DECISION
A. The Legal Issues Addressed in Curtis
The primary issue in Curtis was the classification of rental property
acquired by the wife in her own name. Of the $60,000 sales price, she
paid $28,500 in cash out of her separate funds, and financed the $31,500
balance with a fifteen year mortgage. The rentals from the property
were the exclusive source of the loan repayments. The husband had
intervened in the purchase offer and the act of sale, declaring that the
property was his wife's separate property, it was purchased with her
separate funds under her administration and control, the community
had no interest whatsoever in the property, and all payments would be
made by his wife with her separate funds.
The trial court held the property to be community because com-
munity funds, the rentals, were commingled with separate funds to
acquire the property. The court of appeal held the property to be 47.507o
separate and 52.50o community, based upon the amount of funds each
had contributed. 38 The supreme court disagreed strongly with the ap-
The [husband] purchased property to a much larger amount than he had funds
to pay for at the time, gave some obligations, and assumed the payment of
others; it might be doubted, whether such a purchase could, under any circum-
stances, be considered as an investment of separate funds.
Accordingly, the court found the property to be community.
In Bachino v. Coste, 35 La. Ann. 570, 571 (1883), the court stated:
[T]he burden rests upon the wife, or husband, who claims it as separate estate,
to establish ownership by positive evidence, dehors the recitals of the act, which
alone prove little or nothing. This is done by proving not only the existence,
the origin of the funds, . . . but also the actual investment of the same.
In Moore v. Stancel, 36 La. Ann. 819 (1884), the court indicated that a husband
buying property on credit, if successful in showing a double declaration, would then have
to prove the sufficiency of separate funds and actual use in paying the price. Id. at 823.
37. An additional reason why there is no jurisprudence on credit acquisitions by
husbands could be that the fruits and revenues of the husband's separate property were
always community under prerevision law. Thus, the husband rarely had a source of
separate income with which he could meet deferred payments in a credit transaction.
38. 388 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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proach taken by the court of appeal, stating that Louisiana does not
recognize mixed titles. a9
After summarizing the jurisprudence on classifying credit acquisitions
made by wives, the court repudiated it as discriminatory. The court
then decided that the property was the wife's separate property because
of the husband's declarations in the deed. Invoking the estoppel by deed
doctrine created by the jurisprudence, 40 the court held that because the
husband had appeared in the act and declared the property to be his
wife's separate property, he could not controvert his own declaration
even as to the credit portion of the price.4 1 A subsidiary issue before
the court was the classification of the rentals used to discharge the
credit portion of the price. Liberally interpreting the requirements for
a valid "declaration of paraphernality, ' 42 the court concluded that the
property's rentals were separate, and that the wife therefore owed no
reimbursement 3. 4
B. Curtis' Credit Sale Analysis
In its classification discussion, the court acknowledged that husbands
have been subjected to the double declaration rule, while wives have
not. The court then noted that in credit acquisitions, wives have been
subjected to two requirements: the ample paraphernal effects rule and
the large downpayment rule. Asserting that the imposition of these rules
was intended to prevent wives "from indulging in 'wild and ruinous
speculations,"' the court repudiated the previous jurisprudence as dis-
criminatory:
These judicially imposed restrictions on a wife's freedom to
purchase on credit may have been justified in previous years
when most women stayed home and did not have separate
incomes .... Today, however, with an ever increasing number
of women entering the work force, such restrictions are no longer
supportable.... We believe that a married woman is entitled
39. Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (La. 1981).
40. See, e.g., Stewart v. Mix, 30 La. Ann. 1036 (1878) (one of first cases to apply
the rule).
41. In so holding, the court clarified the estoppel by deed doctrine, while at the
same time interpreting it favorably to the wife.
42. See La. Civ. Code art. 2386 (1870). The phrase "declaration of paraphernality"
is often used to describe an act by which a spouse reserves the fruits and revenues of
separate property as separate.
43. This portion of the opinion was severely criticized. See Note, Community Property-
Characterization of Credit Purchases and the Effects of Estoppel by Deed, 56 Tul. L.
Rev. 1051, 1062 (1982); Note, Curtis v. Curtis: An Unsettling Community Property
Precedent, 28 Loy. L. Rev. 315, 331-32 (1982).
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to purchase property on credit as an investment, and to avail
herself of the same credit devices her husband can use. We do
not believe that she should have to prove that she can use credit
more wisely than he."
The Curtis court announced a new test to replace the discarded
large downpayment rule and ample paraphernal effects rule: if the wife
uses separate funds for the cash portion of the price, the property will
be classified as separate. She need not prove the existence of separate
revenues with which she expects to pay the credit portion of the price,
and if she later uses community funds to pay all or part of the credit
portion, she will owe reimbursement for that amount .4  The court ad-
monished in a footnote that the matrimonial regimes revision did not
apply to the facts of this case, but that the new classification articles
might yield a different result. 4
The court's intention was to afford wives the same freedom to
acquire separate property on credit as husbands by repudiating juris-
prudence perceived to discriminate against wives. While this goal of
equality is laudable, the court's attempted implementation is flawed in
two respects. First, husbands at that time were subjected to the double
declaration requirement. Because the court did not impose this rule upon
wives, the opinion could not produce equality between husbands and
wives.
Second, the court's characterization of the credit sale jurisprudence
as discriminatory is only partially correct. The repudiated jurisprudence
sought to achieve two objectives-the protection of wives from wild and
ruinous speculations and the extension of the reinvestment doctrine to
credit acquisitions. The former purpose is discriminatory only to the
extent that husbands are not equally protected. The second purpose is
not discriminatory. While the Curtis court's denouncement of the dis-
criminatory objective served by the jurisprudence was proper, the dis-
crimination could have been eliminated by extending these rules to
husbands.
Additionally, since the court did not acknowledge that one objective
of the jurisprudence was to apply the reinvestment doctrine to credit
acquisitions, the court failed to consider whether that portion serving
a valid classification function should be retained. Instead, the court
erroneously concluded that both the large downpayment test and the
ample paraphernal effects test should be discarded because they were
created to protect wives from bad investments.
44. Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So. 2d 56, 58 (La. 1981).
45. Id. at 59-60.
46. Id. at 59 n.4.
1990]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The large downpayment test does have a relationship to the rein-
vestment doctrine. If extended to husbands, the test would not be
discriminatory. However, because this test has been practically ignored
by the courts and has never been adequately explained, the court was
probably justified in abandoning it.
The ample paraphernal effects test is an appropriate extension of
the reinvestment doctrine to credit acquisitions. If applied to husbands,
the test would not be discriminatory and would not unreasonably limit
credit acquisitions-it merely requires that a spouse be able to pay for
property out of separate funds if that spouse wants the property to be
classified as separate. The test should have been retained.
In place of the large downpayment test and ample paraphernal effects
test, the Curtis court created a new test for classifying credit acquisitions
that looks only to the source of funds used for the downpayment. This
test is a radical departure from the established jurisprudence. 7 The
potency of the court's credit sale analysis is no doubt diluted by the
presence of additional factors in cases that coalesce in producing the
outcome. Nonetheless, the court repudiated the previous credit sale ju-
risprudence, and substituted a new test. The rule created by Curtis,
which looks only to the source of downpayment in a credit sale, will
be influential unless it is inconsistent with the matrimonial regimes
revision, or unless it is repudiated for promoting an undesirable policy. 48
III. CURRENT CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
The matrimonial regimes revision contains the same broad pre-
sumption of community that existed in pre-revision law. 49 Thus, in any
classification dispute, there is a presumption that the property is com-
munity, with the burden on the spouse claiming the property as separate
to prove that it is separate. Under pre-revision law this presumption
was supplemented by the strong statement in the Code that all acqui-
sitions during the marriage are community property. 0 This statement
47. Only one case was found which indicated that classification of property in a
credit acquisition should be based upon the source of the downpayment. See Blake v.
Hackney, 1 La. App. 558 (2d Cir. 1925). This case cited no authority for its rule, and
is inconsistent with the leading credit sale decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court as late as 1947 reaffirmed that the down-
payment source is not disposititive of classification. See Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29
So. 2d 465 (1947). But see K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 3.23, in 16
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989).
48. The Curtis test has already been invoked in one recent credit sale case. See Lee
v. Manning, 505 So. 2d 902, 904 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
49. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2340 with La. Civ. Code art. 2405 (1870).
50. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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has been suppressed; it has been substituted with the rule that things
bought with community property are community."s
In addition, the Code states that property acquired with separate
things is separate, and that property acquired with community and
separate things is community unless the community things are incon-
sequential when compared to the separate things.5 2 These two classifi-
cation principles are not innovations of the matrimonial regimes revision.
The first principle, that property acquired with separate things is separate,
has been codified since 1912, and was recognized even before that time
through the reinvestment doctrine.5 3 The second principle, one variation
of the commingling rule, while not expressly in the Code prior to the
revision, has also been jurisprudentially recognized.5 4
Application of these classification principles hinges upon interpre-
tation of the word "acquired." Assuming the meaning of the word has
not changed with the revision, there are two principles created by the
judiciary that assist in defining the concept of acquisition. First, ac-
quisition of most property occurs at the point when title passes 55 or
ownership is otherwise obtained. 6 Second, classification of property is
fixed at the moment the property is acquired.57 Therefore, the only
relevant facts are those in existence at the moment when title passes or
ownership is otherwise obtained, and classification of property is de-
termined by the situation of the spouse at that time. There is no
51. See La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
52. See La. Civ. Code art. 2341.
53. In the official comments to article 2341, this principle is called "real subrogation."
See La. Civ. Code art. 2341 comment c.
54. The other variation of the commingling rule involves commingling of separate
funds and community funds in a single bank account. Under the commingling doctrine,
the account balance can be apportioned between one spouse's separate estate and the
community under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Bruuyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La.
736, 47 So. 2d 478 (1950). Apportionment of ownership is never permitted in the second
type of commingling, which occurs when community and separate funds are mixed together
and used to acquire property. Under the commingling doctrine, the thing acquired with
the commingled funds is almost always classified as community, and ownership is never
apportioned between a spouse's separate estate and the community. See, e.g., Succession
of Hyde, 281 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
In some prerevision commingling cases, any amount of commingling would result in
the classification of the thing acquired as community. See, e.g., Succession of Schnitter,
220 La. 323, 56 So. 2d 563 (1951). In most bank account commingling cases, however,
the account would not be classified as community if the community funds were incon-
sequential when compared to the separate funds. See, e.g., Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La.
1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957).
55. See, e.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 174 La. 148, 140 So. 6 (1932).
56. See, e.g., Crouch v. Richardson, 158 La. 822, 104 So. 728 (1925).
57. See, e.g., Succession of Franek, 224 La. 747, 70 So. 2d 670 (1953); Whittington
v. Heirs of Pegues, 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1927).
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indication in the revision that either of these principles has been elim-
inated, although neither has been expressly codified.
In determining whether any test for classifying credit sales is con-
sistent with the revision, its adherence to these principles must be eval-
uated. According to Curtis, if only separate funds are used for the
downpayment in a credit transaction, the property has been acquired
with separate funds, regardless of the source of the deferred payments.
Curtis' "downpayment only" test, by focusing upon the point in time
when title passes, and fixing classification at that moment, is consistent
with both principles. However, the Curtis test disregards one critical
fact: when property is bought on credit, the buyer has not only made
the downpayment, but has become obligated to pay the credit portion
of the price. Credit acquisitions are "acquired" not only with the
downpayment but with the buyer's promise of repayment. By ignoring
the anticipated source of repayment, the Curtis "downpayment only"
test paints an incomplete and unrealistic picture of the concept of
acquisition.5"
The ample paraphernal effects rule repudiated by Curtis is also
consistent with both principles because it focuses upon that point when
ownership is obtained and fixes classification at that moment. Unlike
Curtis' "downpayment only" test, however, the ample paraphernal ef-
fects rule does not ignore the deferred payments in classifying the
property. Under the ample paraphernal effects rule, a spouse claiming
that a credit acquisition is separate must prove not only that the down-
payment was made with separate funds, but that the spouse had the
reasonable expectation of meeting all deferred payments out of separate
funds. The actual source of repayment of the credit portion of the price
should not affect classification because under the traditional principles
concerning acquisitions, classification of property is fixed at the moment
title is transferred and is based upon facts then in existence.5 9 Thus,
the ample paraphernal effects test more accurately and completely de-
scribes the concept of acquisition than does the downpayment only test
adopted in Curtis.
A third possibility for classifying credit acquisitions under the re-
vision is the "commingling" approach suggested by the Curtis court in
a footnote.60 Employment of this approach would require the court to
compare the total community and separate funds used, both for the
downpayment and the deferred payments. Unless the community portion
is inconsequential in comparison to the separate portion, the property
58. But see K. Spaht & L. Hargrave, supra note 47, at 77.
59. The pre-Curtis jurisprudence did not resolve this issue. See supra text accom-
panying notes 29-31.
60. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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would be classified as community. Adoption of the commingling test
for classifying credit acquisitions would constitute a dramatic departure
from both traditional principles because the court would not be focusing
on the point when ownership was acquired, nor would classification be
fixed as of that moment. Furthermore, there is no indication that such
a significant change in approach was intended by the matrimonial regimes
revision. 61 Perhaps the greatest pitfall in applying the commingling test
to credit acquisitions is that ownership of the property could shift each
time a payment is made. Neither ownership nor management of the
property could be determined until the price has been fully paid. This
result is certainly undesirable, as has been pointed out elsewhere. 62
Although the commingling approach alone is not recommended, it
could be used in conjunction with either the Curtis "downpayment only"
test or the ample paraphernal effects test. Under the downpayment only
test, if both community and separate funds are used for the downpay-
ment, the property would be classified as community unless the com-
munity portion of the downpayment is inconsequential. Under the ample
paraphernal effects test, the court would look to the source of the
downpayment and to the expected source of repayment of the deferred
portion of the price. If the acquiring spouse could not reasonably expect
to make all payments out of that spouse's separate funds, the property
would be classified as community unless the amount of community funds
anticipated to be used is inconsequential.
A final63 possibility for classifying credit acquisitions could be to
revert to the "mixed title" approach adopted by the court of appeal
in Curtis.6 This innovative approach, which was rejected by the Louis-
iana Supreme Court long before Curtis,65 has the same disadvantages
as the commingling approach-ownership cannot be ascertained until
the property is completely paid for, and ownership in the interim shifts
with each installment. 66
61. Accord Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981, 42
La. L. Rev. 347, 370-72 (1982).
62. See id.
63. Final in this context means the final approach which will be presented. There
are many approaches which have been followed in other community property jurisdictions,
such as the intent of the lender test used by California courts. See, e.g., Gudelj v. Gudelj,
41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953). The intent of the lender approach has been severely
criticized, however. See, e.g., Young, Community/Separate Classification of Property
Acquired on Credit by Spouses: Is There Logic in the California Law?, 8 Comm. Prop.
J. 237 (1981); Comment, The Division of the Family Residence Acquired with a Mixture
of Separate and Community Funds, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1263 (1982); Comment, The Division
of Property Purchased on Credit Under California Community Property Law: A Proposal
for Reform, 17 Pac. L.J. 129 (1985).
64. See supra text accompanying note 38.
65. See Rousse v. Wheeler, 4 Rob. 114 (La. 1843).
66. It would be possible to modify the mixed title approach so as to align it with
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In summary, both the Curtis "downpayment only" test and the
"ample paraphernal effects" test are compatible with traditional prin-
ciples created to assist courts in interpreting the concept of acquisition
in the community property context. The ample paraphernal effects test
is preferable because it describes more accurately what takes place when
an individual purchases property in a credit acquisition. Nonetheless,
because both are consistent with the current classification articles and
the traditional principles, the courts will likely choose whichever clas-
sification principle advances the more desirable policy.
IV. THE POLICY THAT SHOULD BE PROMOTED
In the community property revision, sexual discrimination has been
replaced by gender neutrality. In most instances this result was achieved
by extending to the disadvantaged spouse the privilege or right previously
given to the favored spouse. The courts must decide whether the liberal
rule for wives created by Curtis should be extended to husbands, or
whether wives should be subjected to a more stringent rule now that
they have been given equal management.
If the Curtis "downpayment only" test is followed, both spouses
will be permitted to acquire separate property by investing a small
amount of separate funds without any expectation of further repayments
out of separate funds. A spouse with a modest separate estate can
augment that estate by knowingly diverting community funds, thereby
depriving the other spouse of an ownership interest in the acquired
property, and relegating him or her to a claim for reimbursement. Under
the applicable reimbursement rule, the owning spouse who has diverted
community funds to acquire separate property receives an "interest free
loan" from the community, 67 meaning that he owes no interest for his
use of community funds and that he need not share any of the asset's
appreciated value with his spouse. This result can be unfair in many
instances. 6
the two traditional precepts. Instead of awaiting final payment to classify the property,
classification would be fixed at the moment title passes, and would be based upon facts
then in existence. The court would determine the source of the downpayment, and evaluate
the extent to which the spouse could reasonably expect to repay the loan out of separate
funds. Ownership would then be apportioned between the spouse's separate estate and
the community according to the amount which each was expected to contribute to the
price. The major flaw with this approach is that the supreme court on several occasions
has strongly rejected any apportionment approach. See, e.g., id. Because it is unlikely
that the supreme court would seriously consider an apportionment approach, this idea
has been humbly relegated to an innocuous footnote.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 2366.
68. Why should a managing spouse ever be permitted to divert community funds to
a separate venture and be liable only for the amount so diverted? The unfairness of the
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Furthermore, regardless of the adequacy of the reimbursement rem-
edy, the law should reasonably favor the community over the spouses'
separate property, while at the same time respecting the integrity of the
spouses' separate property. A rule of interpretation that condones and
even encourages self-seeking by spouses is ill-advised. 69 Therefore, the
reimbursement remedy lies with the interest free loan concept, which strips the community
of the investment value of the diverted funds. The interest free loan concept for reim-
bursement might be appropriate when a spouse is using separate funds for a community
benefit, since such a rule would favor the community in that context. We might assume
that a spouse who uses separate funds for a community purpose does so without any
expectation of return except for the amount so used. But should the law penalize a spouse
whose partner has diverted community funds by giving him or her, years later, only the
amount so used? Such a law is not fair.
There is another unfairness in the reimbursement remedy that warrants mentioning. If
the separate property for which the community funds were used is a home in which the
family lives, the measure of reimbursement is even smaller. Under fairly settled jurispru-
dence (which has not however been sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court) a
distinction is drawn between the principal of a loan on the one hand and interest and
insurance on the other. Reimbursement is owed only to the extent that community funds
were used to discharge the principal of the loan. Reimbursement is not owed to the extent
that community funds were used to pay interest or insurance. The theory of such cases
is that the community should pay rent for use of a spouse's separate property, and
interest/insurance payments should be equated with such rent. See, e.g., Willis v. Willis,
454 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
69. The writer feels as strongly about any Civil Code rule which encourages self-
seeking by spouses, and therefore cannot resist deploring Article 2339, which permits
either spouse to withdraw unilaterally the fruits of his separate property from the com-
munity by filing a declaration in the public records.
Under Spanish law, the fruits and revenues of both spouses' separate property were
community. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales,
30 La. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1969). Louisiana altered the Spanish rule in the 1808 Digest by
providing that the fruits of the wife's paraphernal property would remain separate if she
administered the property herself. La. Digest of 1808 p. 334, art. 61. In 1944 the law
was amended to provide that the fruits of the wife's paraphernal property would remain
separate if she filed a declaration declaring them separate. 1944 La. Acts No. 286, § 1,
amending La. Civ. Code art. 2386 (1870). In the matrimonial regimes revision gender
neutrality was achieved by permitting husbands to reserve the fruits of separate property
as separate by executing a declaration of paraphernality. La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
A declaration of paraphernality does not require notice to the other spouse, let alone
his concurrence. It permits a spouse to be selfish and withdraw the revenues of his separate
property from the community. Prior to the revision, the right given to the wife to withdraw
her fruits from the community was a special privilege for wives who did not have managerial
power. Wives were permitted to administer their paraphernal property and retain its fruits,
perhaps as a cushion against bad management. The 1944 amendment altered the basis of
the right but it remained a limited exception for the non-managing spouse.
Permitting both spouses to withdraw the fruits of their separate property from the
community, as the revision does, changes substantially the basis of the right. It is no
longer a special privilege extended to the nonmanaging spouse to allow the accrual of a
cushion to protect against poor management. It is now a privilege for managing spouses
to decide whether they wish to share. If either wishes to prevent sharing, then that spouse
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Curtis "downpayment only" rule should not be applied to wives under
the revision and should not be extended to husbands. Rather, because
both spouses now possess equal management over the community, each
should be subjected to a classification rule for credit acquisitions that
minimizes self-seeking and reasonably favors the community.
The ample paraphernal effects test should be reinstated. This test
minimizes those instances where a spouse can divert community funds
into that spouse's separate estate because property will not be classified
as separate unless the spouse can prove the reasonable expectancy of
repayment of the deferred portion of the price out of separate funds.7 0
Whether the law should reasonably favor the community over the
spouses' individual estates is a policy decision that the courts must make.
The judiciary has traditionally favored the community, 7' and will likely
continue to do so unless another policy is more desirable. To determine
which policy should be promoted in the classification of credit acqui-
sitions, the courts will likely consider those policies that are promoted
in the matrimonial regimes law under analogous circumstances.
If a spouse who owns separate immovable property builds a house
or other construction thereon with community funds, the house will be
his separate property, but he will owe reimbursement to the other spouse
based upon the interest free loan standard. 72 While this result is consistent
with the outcome under Curtis' "downpayment only" test, the former
result is dictated by a strong policy promoting unity of ownership
between the land and improvements thereon. This policy, which favors
may do so, and need not notify the other spouse. Fruits of separate property are community
only if a spouse feels generous or is ignorant of the law.
If one spouse has substantial separate property and earns little income, that spouse's
separate estate is permitted to grow while the community might become insolvent. The
prerevision law required the managing spouse to share so that the community would be
enriched by the revenues which his separate property produced. Sharing has been diluted
and self-seeking has been codified.
70. It is true that under this test the actual source of repayment of the credit portion
of the price will not affect classification, so that a spouse is still free to divert community
funds into that spouse's separate estate. See supra text accompanying note 59. While this
might happen, the instances in which this is possible are severely limited since the spouse
must prove the reasonable expectancy of repayment out of separate funds in order for
the property to be classified as separate. Furthermore, a spouse who thereafter uses
community funds to pay the deferred portion could be subjected to liability for bad faith
or fraudulent management. La. Civ. Code art. 2354. The measure of loss to the other
spouse should be the investment value of the money that has been diverted.
71. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property in Louis-
iana, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 143, 143-44 (1953). Sometimes the judiciary has overzealously or
unreasonably effectuated the policy when the spouse's separate claim could have been
recognized.
72. La. Civ. Code art. 2366.
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the landowner and thereby recognizes land ownership as the superior
property right,7 is totally absent in a credit sale arrangement.
If a spouse mixes both community and separate funds to acquire
something, the thing acquired would be community unless the community
funds used were inconsequential.7 4 This classification rule, recognized
long before the revision, reasonably favors the community over the
spouses' separate estates. If the Curtis "downpayment only" test is
followed, and a spouse is permitted to acquire a separate thing by using
separate funds for the downpayment when that spouse inevitably must
use community funds for the credit portion, then that spouse would be
treated more favorably than one who commingled funds in a cash
acquisition. There does not appear to be any justification for treating
the credit sale situation more leniently, and the policy favoring the
community should apply equally to both situations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The credit sale cases decided before Curtis needed to be carefully
scrutinized so that any jurisprudentially created rules failing to serve a
valid classification function could be discarded. One objective of the
pre-Curtis jurisprudence was discriminatory-to protect wives from "in-
dulging in wild and ruinous speculation." The Curtis court's repudiation-
of this objective is commendable, but the court went too far by re-
pudiating that portion of the jurisprudence that served a valid classi-
fication purpose. In place of the rejected jurisprudence, Curtis substituted
a new test for classifying credit transactions, one which looks only to
the source of funds for the downpayment to classify the property.
The test created by Curtis, the "downpayment only" test, while
compatible with the current classification articles and with traditional
precepts defining acquisition, is deficient in that its conception of ac-
quisition is incomplete. The problem is that it ignores the source of
repayment of the deferred portion of the price. Additionally, the policy
promoted by the Curtis test is undesirable because it condones and even
encourages self-seeking actions by spouses.
The discrimination effected by the repudiated jurisprudence could
have been eliminated by extending the classification rules to husbands.
Furthermore, despite a discriminatory objective, the jurisprudence pro-
moted a non-discriminatory objective, extension of the reinvestment
doctrine to credit sales. The rejected jurisprudence contained a reasonable
classification rule: the property acquired is separate if the downpayment
is made with separate funds, and if the spouse has the reasonable
73. See, e.g., Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 169
La. 240, 124 So. 841 (1929).
74. La. Civ. Code arts. 2338, 2341.
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expectation of satisfying the credit portion of the price with separate
funds. Like the Curtis "downpayment only" test, the ample paraphernal
effects test is consistent with current classification rules and with tra-
ditional principles concerning acquisition. Furthermore, the ample par-
aphernal effects test reasonably favors the community over the spouses'
separate estates, thus promoting a desirable policy. The courts should
abandon the Curtis downpayment only test and reinstate the ample
paraphernal effects test for classifying credit acquisitions.
